

Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration: The International Community and the Rwandan Process

**A Monograph
by
Major Jeffrey H. Powell, II
United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 2008

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 22-05-2008		2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) July 2007 – May 2008	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration: The International Community and the Rwandan Process				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Jeffrey H. Powell, II (U.S. Army)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 was a cataclysmic international event. Because of the devastation suffered during the genocide, a focused effort at repairing the social fabric of the nation had to take place. The case shows how Rwanda overcame the negative impacts of the international community and implemented two aspects of the amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration process (AR2) by developing interesting and innovative reconciliation and reintegration policies. Throughout the case there are four issues that prove integral to the AR2 process; the anthropology of Rwanda, its colonial history, the international communities actions, and the Rwandan Patriotic Fronts policies that returned the country to its cultural norms. See attached for complete abstract.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Amnesty, Reconciliation, Reintegration, AR2, Armed Reconciler, Rwanda, Genocide, Hutu, Tutsi, Gacaca, Operation Turquoise, UNOMUR, MONUC, UNAMIR, Arusha, Lusaka, Pretoria					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 54	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Stefan J. Banach COL, U.S. Army
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code) 913-758-3302

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Jeffrey H. Powell, II

Title of Monograph: Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration: The International Community and the Rwandan Process

This monograph was defended by the degree candidate on 2 April 2008 and approved by the monograph director and reader named below.

Approved by:

Michael W. Mosser, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

Matthew T. Higginbotham, COL

Monograph Reader

Stefan J. Banach, COL, IN

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

Abstract

Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration: The International Community and the Rwandan Process by MAJOR Jeffrey H. Powell, II, United States Army, 54 pages.

The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 was a cataclysmic international event. Because of the devastation suffered during the genocide, a focused effort at repairing the social fabric of the nation had to take place. The case shows how Rwanda overcame the negative impacts of the international community and implemented two aspects of the amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration process (AR2) by developing interesting and innovative reconciliation and reintegration policies. Throughout the case there are four issues that prove integral to the AR2 process; the anthropology of Rwanda, its colonial history, the international communities actions, and the Rwandan Patriotic Fronts policies that returned the country to its cultural norms.

Rwandan anthropology, cultural understanding, and colonial history play a vital role in forming the foundation for the genocide. These three factors set the conditions for a genocide that saw between 800000 and 1 million people killed in less than four months. The basis for the killing was a perceived and accentuated anthropological difference derived from tribal affiliations of Hutu and Tutsi. That difference gained its accentuation through colonial rule as it was used to divide and subjugate portions of the population, primarily Tutsi subjugation of Hutus. After Rwandan independence created a juxtaposed relationship, the Hutus gained and harshly exerted power over the Tutsis.

Those relationships lead to years of internal strife. Multiple occasions of mass killings, refugee flow to neighboring countries, and the eventual evolution of a revolutionary army culminated in a civil war that began in 1990 between the Hutu-lead government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front that was based in Uganda. The culmination of the civil war was the genocide. A genocide that the international community was slow to react to, failed to stop, and hindered its recovery. Through their policies and actions, the United States and France influenced the AR2 Process.

Finally, in 2002, Rwanda truly moved forward to reconciliation and reintegration. They did this by instituting cultural policies such as the Gacaca Courts and the Ingando Camps. Gacaca Courts were drawn from the shared tribal culture of Rwanda and allowed for perpetrators of the genocide to be meted out justice. This justice helped to heal the mental and societal wounds of the genocide. The Ingando Camps, while controversial, are breeding nationalism by re-teaching the history of Rwanda. Its focus is to discard the Hutu and Tutsi labels of the past, banding everyone together as Rwandan.

Although Rwanda had to overcome many issues, the AR2 Process moves forward with every day of peace that Rwandans share together.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Literary Review	5
Rwandan Society	8
The AR2 Dimensions in Rwanda	10
International Community.....	12
UN Missions to Rwanda 1990 to 1998.....	12
UN brokered agreements from 1990-2002	20
Bilateral Influences on Rwanda.....	25
France	25
The United States	28
Overcoming the Influences of the International Community	31
Unconventional Methods in Rwanda	32
The Economics of Reconciliation.....	35
Implications for AR2.....	37
APPENDIX A: Timeline.....	40
APPENDIX B: Arusha, Lusaka, and Pretoria Agreements.....	45
Arusha Peace Agreement 1994.....	45
Lusaka Agreement 1999.....	48
Pretoria Agreement 2002.....	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY	52

Introduction

Imagine the systematic destruction of the entire population of Indianapolis, Indiana where every man, woman, and child is brutally exterminated, in a period of four months. Picturing an American city of 781,000 completely annihilated is difficult to comprehend. Picture the killing-taking place through a very physical and intimate method like cleaving with a machete makes the scene unbearable to imagine. What could set off such a horrific event? Was the crime of the inhabitants one of religion, ethnicity, or political belief? In 1994, Rwanda experienced a cataclysmic genocide based on a theoretical ethnic divide that had led to years of ineffective domestic governance and divisive assistance from the international community.¹ Following the horrific events of 1994, Rwanda and the international community began the long road back to reconstructing a functioning state through the process of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration (AR2).²

The Rwandan case study demonstrates the negative nature of the relationship between Rwanda and the international community in the amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration process following the civil war and genocide of 1994. The international community provided negative impacts to the Rwandan case through the malpractice of international diplomacy, the manipulation of cultural understanding, and the negligence manifested through the inaction in the face of genocidal crisis. All of these had an overwhelming impact on the AR2 process of Rwanda in the post genocide years. The case also shows how Rwanda overcame the negative impacts of the international community and implemented two aspects of the amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration process (AR2) by developing interesting and innovative reconciliation and

¹ Alain Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide*. (New York: New York University Press, 1995) p.36.

² This monograph is an extension of a Military Review article written by the author as a part of the Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration Writing Team for the School of Advanced Military Studies in 2007. The series of articles began publication in the November-December 2007 issue of Military Review and at the time of the publication of this monograph were still an on-going series.

reintegration policies. The malfeasance of the international community influenced these policies, both directly and indirectly and forced Rwanda to struggle with the implementation of the AR2 process, primarily due to a lack of amnesty.

One of the first things that must be understood is the definition of the amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration process and how the international community plays a role. The Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration Group, formed and developed at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas developed the following definitions and framework in order to research seven case studies, Rwanda being one, to define what the AR2 process encompasses. Using the framework in the figure below and the following definitions, the group created a lens to view each case study.

Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the political, economic and security dimensions laid upon the foundation of the societal sphere.³ Each of the dimensions draws its mores and norms from the societal influence of culture, and thus understanding the culture is paramount in accomplishing the AR2 process. Each dimension within the societal/culture sphere has its own bearing on the distinct environment that the AR2 process is implemented. In




Figure 1: Dimensions of the AR2 Process

some case studies the political dimension is the most important, in others it is economic, in the Rwandan case study the process could not begin until the dimension of security was established. In Rwanda the security dimension was influenced by

³ Michael Mosser. 2007. The "Armed Reconciler": The Military Role in the Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration Process. *Military Review: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army*. 13-19.

many factors; history, international negotiations, international peacekeeping missions, international interference in a civil war, and finally an internationally mediated peace-agreement.

It is imperative to understand that the security dimension is also distinct to its environment. In some cases the international community is required to provide security through the implementation of peacekeeping forces, in other cases it is dependent on the internal police and constabulary forces of a country, in others it focuses on counter-insurgency. In the case of Rwanda the security dimension focuses on an inept international peacekeeping force and a civil war/counter-insurgency.

In the Rwandan case this included securing the borders both externally and internally, the majority of security tasks fall to the local constabulary, assigned peacekeeping force, or intervening nation. The military as a forcing function for the AR2 process in Rwanda is exemplified by two distinct approaches, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda and the intervention force of Operation Turquoise, the French-led “humanitarian assistance operation” that provided safe regions for the Hutu interim government.⁴ In terms of peacekeeping the boundaries of enforcement are drawn from the United Nations Charter, and normally approved by the United Nations Security Council. The United Nations discussions follow later in the paper, and its failures will be summarized.

While security is the most prominent dimensions in facilitating the AR2 process in Rwanda, there is one constituent of the process that is absent from the case study: amnesty. Of the elements that constitute the AR2 process, amnesty is the most difficult for a nation-state to comprehend, define, and realize. Amnesty is defined in the Oxford Essential Dictionary of the

⁴ William J. Durch, ed. *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990's*; J. Matthew Vaccaro, *The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda*. (New York, NY: St. Martins Press, 1996) p. 385-89.

U.S. Military as “an official pardon for people who have been convicted of political offenses,⁵” but in each case the definition is further defined in its socio-cultural context. In Rwanda, that pardon includes a level of justice and forgiveness that includes over 80 years of atrocities propagated between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Amnesty’s western meaning may not fit directly into the cultural context of Rwanda, and whether it is called amnesty or something else, all the Rwandan people must determine it.

Reconciliation has two definitions that create the definition necessary for the AR2 Process. First, “the restoration of friendship and harmony,” and the second being “the submission to or acceptance of something unpleasant.”⁶ It is imperative to understand that in the AR2 Process, the definition of reconciliation lies somewhere in between the two dictionary definitions. Reconciliation in the AR2 process is the ability of the disaffected parties to gain an understanding of each parties’ goals and aims and then work toward the accomplishment of a shared peace and mutually cultivating environment where all members can realize efficacy. The implementation of amnesty and the effective adjudication of its terms throughout the affected society depend on the two definitions being amalgamated into the AR2 process definition of reconciliation.

In Rwanda, reconciliation led to the development of a community based court system to alleviate the massive number of prosecutions stemming from the crimes committed during the genocide. The implementation of “Gacaca” Courts, or grass-roots courts, uses community leaders and local juries to determine the appropriate punishment for crimes committed during the genocide. Justice is an integral part of the reconciliation, and enables all members of the society to be reintegrated with a proposed feeling of equality. Without the realization of either amnesty

⁵ “Amnesty.” *The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military*. Oxford University Press, 2001, 2002

⁶ Merriam and Webster, *Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*. (Springfield: Merriam-Webster INC., Publishers, 1984) 984.

or reconciliation, a society will find the final step in the AR2 process, reintegration, difficult to complete.

Reintegration, defined as “to integrate into an entity; restore to unity”⁷ is a tenuous issue in terms of any society following a civil conflict. The conditions existing in Rwanda, the heinous ferocity of the genocide, the history building up to the event, and civil war, which ensued for the following eight years, has made reintegration difficult without a mandate of amnesty. The case study of Rwanda offers an interesting and troubling method of reintegrating the warring factions following the genocide and war, re-education. Through the *Ingando*, a controversial program developed to re-educate Rwandans on their past, the Rwandan government is working on creating a cohesive society.⁸

Defining what the amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration process brings clarity to the dimensions that lay the foundation for the process. The AR2 process is distinct to its foundational pieces. Although the process cannot be found in any current literature using the current acronym, definitions, or dimensions, for the purpose of this case study it provides architecture to repair the destroyed foundation of Rwandan society.

Literary Review

With the advent of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 there has been a burst of study on the Great Lakes Region of Africa. This case study is the summation of 39 works that include journal articles, monographs, academic studies, books and documentaries. Some of the more contentious arguments about Rwanda lie in its history, from the anthropology of the inhabitants and the roots

⁷ Merriam and Webster, *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*. (Springfield: Merriam-Webster INC., Publishers, 1984) p. 993.

⁸ Chi Mgbako, “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda.” *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 18: (2005) p. 202.

of colonial division, the colonial political influences, Hutu and Tutsi extremism and the persecution of both in Rwanda.⁹

This case study is based on multiple comprehensive works that have been published within the last 10 years. These works were comprehensive due to their study of the societal, political, and security issues that built up to the catastrophic events in Rwanda and then the resulting actions within Rwanda and by the international community.¹⁰ The depth of research performed paints an eloquent and wide-ranging description of the past, present and future of Rwanda. The works ranged from individual research to compilations of large, well-funded groups whose interests went beyond telling the story of Rwanda but expressing the need for humanity throughout the international community.

Other necessary works for review in this case study revolved around one of the most prominent and relevant actors within the case, the United Nations. Both a primary and secondary source provided valuable insight into the United Nations' policies and resolutions that directly affected the events before, during and after the genocide in Rwanda. The concise portrayal found in the secondary source, with brief descriptions of international political decisions that drove those actions illuminates how the interests of the international community influence events, policies, and UN actions.¹¹

Recent secondary sources, most written within the last ten years, provided poignant understanding to the nature of the international dynamics of the Rwandan genocide and the recovery process that evolves into the AR2 process.¹² These sources provided a deep

⁹ Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide*. Et al.

¹⁰ Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) et al.

¹¹ United Nations Bluebook, *The United Nations and Rwanda*. (New York, United Nations, 1996) et al; Durch, *United Nations Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) et al.

¹² Bruce Jones, *Peacemaking and Rwanda*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) et al; Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. Et al.

understanding of the international communities individual interests and actions in the region. The literature defined the divisive players in the Rwandan situation, and what those players' expectations were from Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region in terms of international standing and economic development.

Primary sources provided the best understanding in defining the Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration Process and included journal articles from the Institute of Security Studies, the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, and the Harvard Human Rights Journal. The primary sources provided insightful research, analysis, and commentary on the state of Rwandan society in the post genocide era. The articles and monographs discuss application and failures of the International Criminal Tribunals in Rwanda, the inspiration and implementation of the *Gacaca Courts*, and the implementation of the Semi-Authoritarian policy of *Ingando*. The primary sources tie the past to the present in a concise manner that allows the reader to understand the ramifications of the policies of both the international community and Rwandan governments.

Throughout the literature there is an overwhelming observation that there are deep divisions in the international influences, both the past and present Rwandan governments, and the AR2 process. The literature bears out that Rwanda, bordered by both Anglophone (Uganda and Tanzania) and Francophone (Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo) governments that support both Hutu and Tutsi populations, finds itself at the center of an international tug of war.¹³ Rwanda's security depends on its neighbors and their ability to maintain internal security. The effects of fighting in the Congo influence the actions of Rwanda both internally and externally. Fighting between the government Forces Armed Rwandese and the Rwandan Patriotic Army that followed the 1994 genocide and fall of the Hutu government have influenced security, political

¹³ Arthur J. Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. (New York: University Press, 1998) p. 88

and economic relationships still today and that influence hinders the AR2 process.¹⁴ External security reliance is two fold, international assistance in training and maintaining Rwandan forces and assistance in managing peace agreements in the Great Lakes region.

Rwandan Society

Rwanda lies at the crossroads of the Great Lakes Region of central Africa and experienced a genocide that bordered on a primal killing. Until April 6, 1994, few of the world's citizens were aware of its location, rich history, or its future impact on the international stage in regards to genocide and the amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration process. Although the world played ignorant to the events that took place in Rwanda from April to July of 1994, the major players of the genocide extend beyond the borders of Rwanda. Colonizers such as Belgium and Germany, the world powers of the United States and France, and the leadership of both the Hutus and Tutsis fed the flames of the genocide.¹⁵

The inhumanities of the civil war, unleashed by the death of Rwanda's president, were integral in reforming the world's approach to rebuilding a war-torn country. Rwanda, in concert with the world, is rebuilding its government, establishing new civil-support apparatuses, and reconciling two ethnicities. The foundations for those changes lie in the societal, political, security and economic policies forged by both the international community and the elected government of Rwanda.

Rwanda's influences rest in the colonial policies of Belgium, Germany, and France; policies aimed at dividing the population against itself for easier colonial rule. Those policies, formulated by the colonial rulers of the 19th Century, have had a lasting effect and are the

¹⁴ Ibid p. 159

¹⁵ Johan Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 9-52

foundation for many of the obstacles to the AR2 process in the 21st Century.¹⁶ There are many theories about the origins of the Hutu and Tutsi but there are discernable facts that prove that they are ethnically and anthropologically the same. First, they have always shared the same language, territories, traditions, and taboos. Second, the societal title of Hutu and Tutsi could be transversed through either marriage or the procurement of wealth. Classically, Hutus have been farmers and Tutsis have been herdsmen.¹⁷

Ostensibly, Hutus and Tutsis are the same ethnically. Their societal division is the implementation of a colonial caste system based on tribal lore and perpetrated through political policies.¹⁸ Every European country responsible for the colonial rule of Rwanda exploited the societal anthropology of Hutuism and Tutsism. The reason for the exploitation was solely for economic purposes; Tutsis were designated the administrators and Hutus were designated as the workers.¹⁹ Under Belgian rule, this classification could change based on the number of cattle a person owned and was usually directly attributed to the head of a family. The basis for Hutuism and Tutsism was accentuated by two policies; the use of identification cards by the Belgians and the “Hamitic Theory” used by the Hutus when they came to power in 1959.²⁰

The societal burden of this lore, and colonial intervention, led to misguided rule before and after Rwandan independence. Prior to independence, the colonial departments conducted governance through a Tutsi hierarchy. After independence in 1959, international support dramatically switched to the Hutus. During the entire reign of Hutu governance, Tutsis became the “scapegoats” of all failed policies. The Tutsis suffered decreased educational opportunities,

¹⁶ Appendix A, p.39

¹⁷ Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide*. p. 36-37.

¹⁸ Aimable Twagilimana, *The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide*. (Lanham: University Press of America, 2003) 36-38.

¹⁹ Des Forges *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. p. 34-38.

²⁰ Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. 6-7; Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide*. p. 40-42.

segregation from government positions, removal from positions of influences such as teachers and judges, and were subject to massacres at the hands of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR).²¹

The continued shift of power between Hutu and Tutsi led to the devastating divide that inhibits every facet of amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration. Following the thirty years of independent rule under the Hutus, the current Rwandan government must overcome any perception of Tutsi favoritism or nepotism. Overcoming the perception of Tutsi nepotism is paramount in government positions, the adjudication of justice, and the re-education of Hutus and Tutsis in the Ingando program.

The Hutu perpetrated genocide on the Tutsis had a devastating effect on the Rwandan economy. The four years of civil war, in concert with the genocide, destroyed the economic capability of the entire country. The genocide had the direst effects as professionals were targeted first due to their propensity to dissent to the Hutu extermination policy. Within the first weeks of the onset of the genocide many of the doctors, lawyers, judges and teachers had been eradicated.²² It removed basic industry, civil services, and key infrastructure. Finally, the societal divide between Hutus and Tutsis threatens the internal and external security of whichever ethnic group comes to power. Since the end of the civil war, there has been 12 years of cross border incursions between exiled Hutus in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwandan Patriotic Army Forces. Without reconciliation, Rwanda faces stark challenges in the future, which could include another major civil war.

The AR2 Dimensions in Rwanda

Security within Rwanda encompasses the external and internal aspects of providing the rule of law, civil support apparatus, and protection. In the AR2 process “the security dimension

²¹ Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide*. p. 41-47.

²² Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. p. 205-7

of the society is one where issues facing society are best dealt with using the tools of the police, the judiciary, and/or military force (where appropriate, e.g., support to civil authorities during national disasters).”²³ Rwanda must overcome multiple challenges in securing its society. First, Rwanda must understand, guide, and implement the international tools provided to gain security in terms of the United Nations. Second, it must be able to manage unilateral actions from other nation-states, whether they are their Great Lakes Region neighbors or Western industrialized nations. Finally, it must develop a coherent security apparatus that is capable of providing both a military and police force to maintain the rule of law within Rwandan borders. Given security, Rwanda can focus on developing and implementing political and economic reforms that benefit its citizens, the Great Lakes region and the international community.

The political dimension of the AR2 process in Rwanda is complex and dynamic. The actors involved in Rwanda’s case study include rebel movements, suppressive governments, and insurgencies. All of these are influenced by both state and non-state outside actors that are attempting to fulfill both their own self-interests and the perceived interests of the world. The groups within Rwanda, from 1990-1994, consisted of the Habyarimana government, the Forces Armées Rwandaises, the French and Belgian governments throughout all elements of national power, and elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Army engaged in insurgent activities against the Rwandan government. The outside influences include the United Nations, the United States, regional neighbors, multiple other European countries, and non-governmental international organizations. All of these actors played a role in the AR2 process of Rwanda.

Each of these dimensions influences the AR2 process in Rwanda sometimes singularly, sometimes simultaneously with one other dimension, and sometimes all of them act in

²³Michael Mosser. 2007. The “Armed Reconciler”: The Military Role in the Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration Process. *Military Review: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army*. 15.

concert. The AR2 Process is a virtual marionette and the dimensions are the strings that cause the movement, with each of the actors taking control of the strings at their whim.

International Community

The international community, composed of the United Nations, France and Regional Actors, and the United States has influenced the AR2 process in Rwanda through varying degrees of assistance and interference. The divisive assistance was in the form of peacekeeping forces, negotiating teams, advisory teams, strategic partnership, and economic assistance. The outstanding question is how can assistance be divisive. In Rwanda the negative impact of the international assistance contributed to the divisive environment that existed between the Hutus and Tutsis.

The United Nations has been instrumental in providing peacekeepers, cease-fire observers, and regional assistance in negotiating peace with Rwanda's neighbors, judicial assistance, and economic recovery assets. France provided military assistance and strategic support to the Hutu-led government and was instrumental in providing so-called humanitarian assistance immediately following the genocide event. The United States, although slow to act during the genocide, has increasingly become a strategic partner to Rwanda. Overall, for the accusations of inaction leveled at the international community before and during the genocide, the amount of interaction between Rwanda and the international community was constant and consistent.

UN Missions to Rwanda 1990 to 1998

One of the primary means, and most visible forms of interaction between Rwanda and the international community came in the form of United Nations peacekeeping operations. From 1990-1998 there were three operations within Rwanda and one outside of Rwanda that was a direct result of the Rwandan conflict. The first mission originated from the civil conflict between the Hutu-Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front and was the beginning of the

international community's full commitment to the issues within Rwanda. Rwanda's societal schism came to the forefront of the international stage in October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front mounted an offensive from Uganda to overthrow the Hutu-led government. The RPA successfully seized territory within Rwanda, and it was feared by the Belgians and French governments, would achieve their military objectives. The Rwandan Armed Forces²⁴ were on the brink of defeat when they received military assistance from the Belgians and French. French military assistance turned the tide of the battle when the FAR was able to destroy large numbers of RPA forces and key military leaders using precision aerial spotters in conjunction with ground and air fires.²⁵ At the conclusion of the fighting a neutral military observer group, sponsored by the Organization of African Unity moved into the Rwandan-Ugandan border region to observe the cease-fire agreement.

The first mission was a peace-observer mission, United Nations Observer Mission to Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), UNSCR 846, which began in June 1993.²⁶ The mission supplanted the Organization of African Unity from its supervisory role of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) monitoring the 1990 cease-fire between Rwanda and the RPF.²⁷ This displacement of the OAU placed the onus for security and maintaining separation between the two warring factions squarely on the shoulders of the international community. This first

²⁴ The Hutu lead government, Rwandan Armed Forces were known as the Forces Armées of Rwanda (FAR) on the African continent and within the Great Lakes Region. Throughout this paper they are referenced as the FAR. See Appendix A.

²⁵ Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 28-31.

²⁶ "UNOMUR was deployed on the Ugandan side of the border between Uganda and Rwanda in accordance with Security Council [resolution 846 \(1993\)](#) of 22 June 1993. Its mandate was to monitor that border "to verify that no military assistance reaches Rwanda, focus being put primarily in this regard on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use". http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomurmandate.html (accessed 14 December 2007 - 29 February 2008).

²⁷ The Organization of African Unity founded in 1964 became the African Union in 2001.

intervention by the international community was disjointed in its approach, as many of the member-nations were reluctant to intervene in the border observation. The basis for their reluctance was that the mission would continue to expand as tensions rose in Rwanda, in the fall of 1993 that is what happened.²⁸

Even with an observer force in place, the civil war raged from 1990 until August 1993, until the employment of detailed peace negotiations by regional and international actors. The second mission was the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) that began in October 1993.²⁹ UNAMIR's purpose was to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The commander of UNAMIR was Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire. Although an exquisite military officer, he did not possess the expertise or understanding to implement the mandate of UNAMIR. His peacekeeping force was severely undermanned, under-equipped and under-funded. Furthermore, the United Nations leadership usurped his command decision process by forcing every decision he made to be reviewed and approved by the United Nations.³⁰

From October 1993 until April of 1994, there was little movement towards peace, reconciliation or the implementation of the Arusha Accords. Failures by both the Hutu-lead government of President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Rwandan Patriotic Front bogged down the progress of the comprehensive peace plan.³¹ Through a concerted effort by the Secretary-General

²⁸ United Nations Bluebook, *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996*. p.33, 47-49.

²⁹ UNAMIR was established by Security Council [resolution 872 \(1993\)](#) of 5 October 1993 to help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed by the Rwandese parties on 4 August 1993. UNAMIR's mandate was: to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirM.htm (accessed 14 December 2007 - 29 February 2008)

³⁰ Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. p. 172-174

³¹ Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch p. 367-369.

of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali and African Regional actors, particularly Tanzania, the peace initiative was put back on track. President Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam, Burundi to meet with other signatories of the Accords.

On his return flight, accompanied by the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, his plane was shot down on approach to Kigali by Hutu Extremist in the Presidential Guard.³² The death of the president ignited one of the worst genocides in history. Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense, took power. Although Bagosora did not ascend to the presidency of Rwanda, his persistent deviousness led to the murder of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana a Hutu moderate.

In the first hours after the downing of the Habyarimana's plane, Bagosora began consolidating Hutu-extremist power by exterminating key Tutsi and moderate-Hutu leaders. Within 48 hours, Bagosora replaced the entire government.³³ Three evil elements came into concert with Bagosora's ascendance to power; a youth movement that had been invigorated by constant propaganda, a well-trained and loyal officership that was willing to serve him, and his own Rwandan military experience, both as a soldier and its leader. Bagosora was able to whip the FAR and local militias, known as *Interahamwe*, into a deadly fervor to achieve his desired genocidal effect.³⁴

UNAMIR's small force structure and minimal mandate was no match for Bagosora's force. Dallaire was caught in a cataclysmic event, trying to negotiate peace, maintain his force and assuage the information requirements of his UN masters. During the initial melee, ten Belgian peacekeepers were brutally murdered by the FAR while trying to secure the residence of

³² Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. p. 117-119.

³³ Scott Strauss, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006) 46-48.

³⁴ *Interahamwe*, defined as "Those Who Stand Together," or "Those Who Attack Together," were the Youth Militia mobilized by President Habyarimana in 1992 and an integral part of the 1994 genocide. Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. p. 4.

the Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana. While in route to a meeting with the interim government leadership, Dallaire passed the encampment where the bodies of the Belgian soldiers lay. He attempted, and was refused; to enter into the camp by FAR soldiers. Dallaire waited until the meetings conclusion to request the rescue of the soldiers he had seen in the camp, but by then it was too late. Bagosora later told Dallaire that the killings were unfortunate, but it may be an indication that the Belgian peacekeepers needed to leave.³⁵ At this point, Dallaire had lost control of the situation. As Dallaire struggled in Kigali the Rwandan Patriotic Front began taking advantage of the chaos.

The events within Kigali were part of a cascading effect beginning with the death of Habyarimana and progressing to the actions of Major-General Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) when they began an offensive to alleviate the FAR and *Interahamwe* attacks on the civilian population. Dallaire, as in his relationship with Bagosora, was joined in communication with the RPA through Kagame. Kagame made his intentions known that he was moving to take Kigali and end the suffering of the Rwandan Tutsis. From the beginning of the RPA offensive on April 8, 1994 until the fall of Kigali on July 4, 1994, Kagame's forces handily defeated the numerically superior FAR.³⁶ Without the military offensive conducted by the RPA the genocide in Rwanda would not have ended in July. There was no military action from the international community to put an end to the genocide in Rwanda.

In the four months of fighting, the UNAMIR Force was militarily incapable of stopping the rampaging FAR. General Dallaire's force lacked a United Nations mandate and the military force structure to accomplish such a daunting task. From the onset of the genocide the United Nations changed the UNAMIR mandate two times. The first major change occurred on 21 April

³⁵ Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. p.189-192.

³⁶ Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. p. 64-71.

1994. The UN Security Council voted to reduce the UNAMIR mandate and force structure, further weakening any capability to stop the genocide. In May 1994, the Security Council reversed itself, increased the UN mandate, and increased the troop strength to 5500 in order to restore peace, but it was already too late.³⁷ The genocide did not end due to these changes. It only ended when the Kagame-lead RPA achieved a fragile peace with the fall of Kigali and the routing of the remaining FAR to Zaire in July of 1994.

Even with the RPA victory in July 1994, Rwanda faced a complex fusion of internal security, external security, and regional security influences. The complexities of the situation hinged on actions of the international community through the French Operation Turquoise to the United States led Operation Support Hope. Both operations had a profound impact on Rwanda and were major contributing factors to the years of war that followed the genocide and the fall of Kigali to the RPF. Operations Turquoise provided time and space for the Hutu government to withdraw from the conflict with the RPF through the zone of security the French created. Operation Support Hope provided a gateway for a majority of the non-military affiliated Hutus of the *Interahamwe* to escape through the refugee camps.

The escaping elements that were fortified by the two operations instigated Rwanda's requirement for security and led to the third United Nations peacekeeping mission in the region, the United Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The RPA attack into Zaire in order to secure its border against the escaped FAR and Interahamwe forces instigated the need for MONUC. The RPF attack brought about an alliance between itself and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) that was attempting to overthrow

³⁷ Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch p. 376-378.

President Mobutu Sese Seko.³⁸ This action, while raising the ire of the international community, effectively secured the western Rwandan border. The incursion also led to the fall of the Zaire government and the inception of a UN Mission that finally secured the Zaire-Rwandan border.³⁹ This constant fighting detracted from any sense of healing between the warring factions preventing any immediate approaches to the AR2 process.

Continuing the conflict into Zaire placed an enormous strain on the security of Rwanda. Already stretched thin by casualties from four years of fighting before the 1994 genocide, followed by the campaign to seize Kigali with follow on operations to secure the western Rwandan border, an exasperated RPA assumed the responsibility for the internal policing of Rwanda, securing of internally displaced persons, and guarding the overcrowded prison systems. The RPA was no longer the well-trained, disciplined force that had achieved victory over the FAR. The RPA, beset with untrained volunteers and expatriates, sought revenge for the genocide.⁴⁰

Although the RPA incursion into Zaire created an international backlash to the new government, it had a domino effect for Rwanda. First, it secured the western border of Rwanda. Second, it caused the collapse of the government of Zaire through the Rwandan support of the ADFL. Finally, it caused all member states of the Great Lakes Region to become stakeholders in the success of the new Rwandan government. The main conflict did not end until the implementation of the fragile Lusaka Accord on July 10, 1999 between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Angola, Namibia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.⁴¹ The downgrading of the

³⁸ The Democratic Republic of Congo was known as the country of Zaire from 1971 through 1997, when President Mobutu Sese Seko renamed the country. After his overthrow in 1997, the country assumed its previous name.

³⁹ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. p. 144-150.

⁴⁰ Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. p. 125.

⁴¹ The United Nations webpage provides all of the information about the peace accords/agreements, the mandates for the peacekeeping missions, and the troop levels provided by the

internal conflict between Hutus and Tutsis took place in 1999 with the defeat of FAR and *Interahamwe* forces located in the border region with the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The military victory also provided a sharp decline in terrorist attacks within Rwanda, and a degree of normalcy began with the new millennia.⁴² This increase in security was crucial. With security the RPF government could begin to implement domestic policies that ranged beyond security and served the needs of the people. The Lusaka agreement failed within months of its implementation and fighting ignited again, finally ending in 2002 with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement.⁴³ By gaining basic security for Rwanda, the AR2 process could begin to overcome the societal divide.

The societal divide between the warring factions, Hutus and Tutsis was at its widest point following twelve years of armed conflict. With Rwandans still faced with insurgent cross border attacks, even with the largest on-going peacekeeping mission, United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC), the thoughts of amnesty and reconciliation were distant dreams. Tutsis felt no remorse for the displaced Hutus beyond the borders of Rwanda or their fellow Hutu citizens due to the constant threat to their security posed by the disaffected Hutus. This lack of empathy led to an inability to forgive the Hutus for the genocide and the ensuing conflict throughout the Nineties. Although Rwanda had achieved a ceasefire, this societal cleavage affected its ability to implement amnesty to either warring faction, an amnesty necessary to reconcile and rebuild the political and economic infrastructure of Rwanda.

member nations. Information cited was drawn from the following web address:
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/background.html> (accessed 14 December 2007 - 29 February 2008)

⁴² Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front.*, P.146.

⁴³ MDRP Fact Sheet: Rwanda. http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_RWA_FS_0507.pdf (accessed 1 September 2007 - 29 February 2008).

This final conflict between the RPF and the FAR that led to the fall of a Hutu-led government stemmed from the failure of the international community to create and implement a satisfactory peace-agreement in a timely manner throughout the negotiation process from 1990-1994.⁴⁴ Had the international community been able to identify the cultural subtleties of Rwanda that influenced both the international and domestic perspectives, it would have been able to avoid the horrendous genocide and ensuing civil war. Multiple attempts over between 1990-2002 have been made by the international community to broker a peace agreement, each has been touted as the ultimate agreement, each has been implemented, and each has led to continued fighting. To understand the failure, this paper will outline the main agreements between the RPF and FAR between 1990-2002.

UN brokered agreements from 1990-2002

The United Nations has been the second largest international actor in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region since the end of colonial rule in the middle of the 20th Century. Beyond the scope of UN Security Council missions, the United Nations has mediated negotiations on multiple occasions since Rwanda became independent in 1959. The most prevalent of those negotiated agreements include the attempts to end civil unrest in 1990 which placed the UNAMIR mission in Kigali, the continued negotiation for shared government at the Arusha Accords from 1992-1994, the Lusaka Accords that penultimate attempt to end the divisive fighting in the region between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the final accord signed in 2002 known as the Pretoria Agreement which has brought a tenuous peace to the region. Each of these agreements or accords has had massive influence on the AR2

⁴⁴ Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide*. (New York: Verso, 2004) p. 60-64.

Process. They each have the same Hutu/Tutsi root, and each agreement fails to fully address and implement policies that facilitate the AR2 Process. The path of these agreements began in 1990.

Working diligently beyond the shine of western media, the international community began working toward an amicable settlement in Rwanda in 1990. After the defeat of the RPF invasion from Uganda, the international community worked in earnest to sign and implement a ceasefire agreement. Surrounding countries, joined by FAR and RPF observers, monitored the ceasefire until 1992 when the civil war ignited again. Western diplomats worked feverishly to implement a second ceasefire, and in May 1992 the fighting stopped again. In July intense negotiations began in Arusha, Tanzania on what is known as the Arusha Accords.⁴⁵

The design of the Arusha Accord was to split the ruling power between the Hutus and Tutsis. Surrounded by countries that had worked through this tribal issue the Accords brought together the countries Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Zaire to help mete out an agreement in Rwanda. Western influence on the process came from Belgium, France, Germany and the United States. The Accords created a transitional government, a commission to oversee the return of Rwanda refugees from throughout the Great Lakes Region, and a request for a neutral international force to implement the agreement.⁴⁶

Each time the Accords seemed to be reaching a culmination, and an amicable agreement could be implemented, there was a failure because of two major points of contention; first the distribution of seats in the Rwandan Cabinet and Parliament. This argument fell directly along the lines of population majority and representation, which Tutsis wanted to ensure, was offset by a disproportionate number of seats being given to their minority. Ruling Hutus conversely wanted the government to be representative of the tribal population make-up, thus maintaining a Hutu ruling majority. The second point of contention lay in the distribution of leadership

⁴⁵ Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. p. 25-27.

positions of the Armed Forces and the integration of the RPA into the FAR's ranks.⁴⁷ The two issues stemmed from the same root, the perception of equality between Hutus and Tutsis. Each subsequent agreement within Rwanda, with its ultimate goal to end fighting and bring peace, would return to the seminal issue of reconciling and re-integrating Rwandan society.

The first agreement that attempted to end the armed conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda in the post-genocide era was the Lusaka Accords.⁴⁸ The Lusaka Accords were the culmination of the fighting within the Democratic Republic of Congo that propagated from the fighting between the remnants of the FAR that fled Rwanda in 1994 and the pursuing Rwandan Patriotic Army. In the view of the RPF, the most dangerous and indictable elements of the genocide had used the protection of Congolese borders to regroup and mount a counter-offensive/insurgency against the new government. The RPF had evidence that both the French and Congolese governments were supporting the former elements of the Habyarimana government. After nearly a decade of fighting between the FAR and the RPF they, along with 5 other member nations, sat at the bargaining table to end the fighting.⁴⁹

The fighting in the DRC devolved into a clash of self-serving militant groups seeking to overthrow state governments. As each state government's military forces pursued the "armed groups" they also became entangled in fighting over DRC sovereignty. The Lusaka Accords brought the pursuing efforts of the DRC, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda and Uganda into

⁴⁶ United Nations Bluebook, *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996*. p.371-2.

⁴⁷ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. p. 93-95.

⁴⁸ Appendix B is a brief of the Lusaka Accords found on the University of Pennsylvania website. *DRC: Summary of the Lusaka Accord*. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_72299c.html (accessed 14 December 2007 - 29 February 2008)

⁴⁹ Ibid.

concert in the hopes of achieving their national security interest.⁵⁰ The accord “envisages the tracking down and disarming of armed groups, the screening of mass killers and war criminals, and the handing over of suspected 'genocidaries' to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania.” Each country that was the origin of the “armed groups” pledged to repatriate them back to their homelands through their own process amnesty and reintegration.

The "armed groups" operating within the DRC were the Rwandan ex-FAR and *Interahamwe*, the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II), the Former Ugandan National Army (FUNA), the Burundian Forces de defense pour la democratie (FDD) and Angola's UNITA.⁵¹ Each of the Great Lakes Region countries had a stake in the success of the Lusaka Accords in order to stabilize the region and return it to productivity. Interference from the Congolese government and France would make it impossible for the Accord to remain in place. President Kabila, very popular in eastern Congo, had integrated the former FAR and *Interahamwe* into the Congolese Army which prevented him from adhering to one of the major contingencies of the Lusaka Accords. That failed contingency, failing to disarm and send the opposition forces home to their country to be integrated into the AR2 Process, drew Rwanda back into a conflict with the DRC. The failure to adhere to this point led to the breakdown of the Accords as guerilla attacks continued from the DRC into Rwanda with full-scale war erupting again in 2000 between Rwanda and the DRC.⁵²

⁵⁰ Appendix B is a brief of the Lusaka Accords found on the University of Pennsylvania website. *DRC: Summary of the Lusaka Accord*. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_72299c.html (accessed 14 December 2007 - 29 February 2008)

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. p.133-34.

A multitude of factors led to the continued conflict between Rwanda and the DRC. First, Rwanda felt that the DRC had failed to uphold the requirements of the Lusaka Accord by returning the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* to Rwanda. Second, the jungles of eastern Congo were becoming a lawless zone where transnational organizations bent on unhinging multiple governments of the Great Lakes Region were hiding. Finally, the DRC and many member nations of the United Nations, believed that Rwanda was using the cover of chasing ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* to exploit and steal valuable natural resources from the eastern DRC. Each of these factors made the region a powder keg that influenced stability in Rwanda, the DRC, Uganda, and Burundi.⁵³ After two more years of fighting, between DRC forces, former FAR and *Interahamwe*, and the RPA the United Nations brokered a second agreement specifically aimed at the conflict resolution between Rwanda and the DRC.

The Pretoria Agreement hinged on the Lusaka Accords, call for greater enforcement of all of its covenants and requirements.⁵⁴ The weight of the agreement fell on the DRC, forcing it to participate with the UN Peace-keeping mission in the DRC (MONUC) and the return of all ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* to Rwanda. The greatest requirement of Rwanda was the complete withdrawal of its forces from the DRC.⁵⁵ Since the completion of the Pretoria Agreement, all of these factors have been rigorously enforced, with MONUC being the largest on going peace-

⁵³ Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front* p. 136-45.

⁵⁴ Appendix B is a copy of the United States Department of State documents that outline the Pretoria Agreement. The webpage is <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/csbn/rd/22637.html> (accessed 14 December 2007 - 29 February 2008).

⁵⁵ United States Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/csbn/rd/22637.html> (accessed 14 December 2007 - 29 February 2008).

keeping operation in Africa and the largest one being implemented by the United Nations in the world.⁵⁶

Bilateral Influences on Rwanda

From the onset of the conflict in Rwanda, the international community involvement revolved around the United Nations. Beyond the United Nations involvement in Rwanda, lie the subtleties of nation-state interests and actions that had a direct impact on the AR2 Process in Rwanda. The nation-states with the greatest influence in the region were, by order of precedence, France, the United States, Great Britain and Belgium. Each nation pursued its national interests in its own distinct way, having both good and bad effects on Rwandan Society.

These interests, although not attributable to all of the nations, include attempted hegemony over the region, exploitation of resources, and implementation of forms of governments. Rwanda did not have unique experience with Western Diplomacy. Like other African nations, it fell between selfish actions and inactions of its more powerful Western counter-parts. Emerging as the two primary, external actors, France and the United States hold the greatest influence over the AR2 process in today's Rwanda. The French influenced the process through their actions before and during the genocide. The United States has influenced the process through actions during the genocide to the current date.

France

Although client relationships existed between Rwanda and multiple European countries, one country was at the forefront of protecting the Hutu-led government, France.⁵⁷ The French

⁵⁶ United Nations. United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/background.html> (accessed 14 December 2007 - 29 February 2008).

⁵⁷ "France relented... over the RPF's defeat of a French client." p. 86. The client is one that receives security, economic, or political assistance in a quid-pro-quo relationship with another nation-state. In terms of Rwanda before 1994, the Habyarimana regime was a client of France. Klinghoffer, p. 81-8.

government had an existing relationship with the Habyarimana Regime, deeply involved politically, economically, and militarily. Maintaining Habyarimana, the leader of the Francophone regime, was of French national interest.⁵⁸ The greatest of these interests was maintaining a Francophone region on the African continent where France could be the preeminent power. That preeminence would lead to exclusive trade agreements and an ability to move back to the forefront on the world stage of dominant power. France was not wedded to any particular political ideology or ethnicity in the pursuit of its policy, only that the state was a Francophone promoting cultural ties and ease for trading.⁵⁹

France's influence and relationship with the Habyarimana government in Rwanda had a negative impact on the AR2 Process in Rwanda. The French military influence had the greatest negative impact. France's military support of the FAR in 1990, and again in 1994 set the tone of all future perceptions of France in the region. France, although trying to appear as an "honest broker," was not trusted by the RPF due their history of providing military assistance and advisors to the FAR and their political influence on Habyarimana.

During the 1990 RPF Offensive based from Uganda, both French and Belgian advisors provided critical military advisory support to the FAR that allowed them to defeat the RPF. There have been claims that French involvement went beyond the advisory role including combatant command of the entire operation to direct action by French commandos.⁶⁰ In 1991, France directly influenced the political landscape by forcing the Habyarimana regime to integrate Tutsis into the government.⁶¹ Even though France made the push for integration, they did little to assuage the existing anguish between the warring Hutus and Tutsis. They continued to train the

⁵⁸ Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. p. 668-70.

⁵⁹ Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. p.88

⁶⁰ Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. p.52

⁶¹ Scott Strauss, *The Order of Genocide*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.) p.24.

Hutu dominated Army and provide valuable logistics supports. This unfettered French support led the Hutu Habyarimana regime to disregard the calls for reform and integration. France's negligence was key in setting the conditions for the genocide, and later created deep resentment in the Tutsi-led RPF.

France further influenced the AR2 Process by its actions in June 1994. With the genocide in its third month, and all-out civil war taking place throughout Rwanda, France introduced a "humanitarian intervention plan" to the United Nations to stop the killing. Understanding that a French force could not enter into Rwanda to serve the self-interests of the French government, the French sought, and received, a United Nations mandate under Chapter VII to provide humanitarian assistance and stop the genocide on June 22, 1994.⁶²

Dubbed "Operation Turquoise," the French plan was to arrive in Rwanda and create a "humanitarian protection zone."⁶³ Within that zone, they would create a safe-haven for those being persecuted in the genocide, and for those trying to escape from being caught in between the warring FAR and RPA forces. What the French created was a pathway for the retreating FAR and *Interahamwe* forces that had been perpetrating the genocide on the Tutsi population. Many Hutu extremists escaped through the French Security Zone created by Operation Turquoise. The challenges of securing Rwanda began immediately after the fall of Kigali in July 1994. Hundreds of thousands of Hutu Rwandans fled into neighboring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). Intermingled with the fleeing civilians, were 20000 FAR soldiers with 62 armored vehicles, numerous heavy weapons, and many key leaders and the lethal *Interahamwe*, Hutu militia that had carried out most of the genocide.⁶⁴ Most of those soldiers and equipment went

⁶² Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch, p. 385-87.

⁶³ Ibid. p. 388.

⁶⁴ Waugh, Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. p.100-101.

through the zone of protections created by French soldiers. This assistance to the former Habyarimana/Interim government, coupled with the capture of French and West Indian advisors during the push to seize Kigali stung the RPF, and accentuated the feeling that France was acting as an ally and not a third party intermediary.⁶⁵

The second and third order effects of Turquoise were devastating; first, it allowed the guilty *Interahamwe* to escape to neighboring countries after committing unbelievable atrocities. Second, it presented the appearance of an “honest broker” choosing sides and representing its on interests. Third, it led to regional strife that gripped the Rwanda, DRC, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania until the final United Nations peace agreement in Pretoria, South Africa in 2002. Finally, it created negative sentiment between the new government of Rwanda, the RPF, and the French government that was not overcome until 1999.⁶⁶ While France’s actions had an immediate and lasting effect on the AR2 process in Rwanda, the inaction of the United States contributed to how Rwanda implemented its policies of reconciliation and reintegration.

The United States

The United States with its great capabilities and international power failed to act during the Rwandan genocide but was quick to act at its conclusion.⁶⁷ This reluctance influenced the AR2 Process through both negative and positive means. First, the United States failed to decrease the level of initial suffering caused by the genocide. This was manifested by not recognizing the activities in Rwanda as genocide, but merely as acts of genocide.⁶⁸ The allowance of the atrocity contributed to the increased divide that future Rwandans would have to overcome

⁶⁵ Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. p. 82.

⁶⁶ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. p. 125-6.

⁶⁷ Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002) p.172.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 161-163.

in the AR2 process. Second, a positive aspect was the alacrity of the United States government in recognizing the Rwandan Patriotic Front as the formal government once it assumed power in Kigali in July 1994. The United States and the United Kingdom, being the first to recognize the new government, worked in concert to create a diplomatic environment where Rwanda could flourish. At the conclusion of the genocide and civil war both countries provided assistance those countries to help restore Rwandan society.⁶⁹

As the genocide unfolded within Rwanda, the United States was still recovering from its failed attempt to stabilize Somalia while part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission there in 1992-1993. The death of 18 U.S. Army Rangers had shaken the new Clinton Administration of its enthusiasm to use the United States military as the forerunner in its foreign policy. It also changed the Clinton Administrations willingness to provide military power to UN Peace-keeping missions.⁷⁰

That reluctance fed the United States' inaction in Rwanda. From her powerful position on the United Nations Security Council, Madeleine Albright, the US Ambassador to the United Nations kept the atrocities in Rwanda from being labeled genocide. The United States also did not commit troops to the UNAMIR mission and worked to limit the original scope of that mission. Although the United States Marines were sent to evacuate the embassy, no US troops were sent to intervene in the civil war or participate in the peacekeeping mission.⁷¹

The lack of action by the world's only "super power" enabled other countries to avoid the morale responsibility to stop the genocide. It was not until near the conclusion of the genocide and the fall of Kigali to the RPF that the United States closed the Rwandan Embassy in

⁶⁹ Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. p. 96-101.

⁷⁰ Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide*. p.70.

⁷¹ Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. p. 91-100.

Washington and sent its entire staff back to Rwanda, stating that the United States government would not maintain diplomatic ties with a government that purported “acts of genocide.”⁷² After the fall of Kigali a mass of refugees began fleeing from Rwanda. The international press magnified the human suffering of the refugee flow, and in July 1994 President Clinton ordered NATO commanders to support humanitarian organizations providing relief in Rwanda in “Operation Support Hope.” It was the only major military support in relief of the genocide by the United States.⁷³

The inaction pre-dating the close of the Rwandan Embassy was powerful. Although the United States and Great Britain were the first to recognize the new RPF government, it was not until 1998, four years after the RPF came to power, that the healing from the inaction began between Rwanda and the United States. President Bill Clinton, visiting Rwanda, apologized for the lack of effort by the United States and the international community to intervene in the genocide.⁷⁴ President Clinton’s words did not fill the void of the inaction that had led to one of the worst genocides in the 20th Century. Had the United States intervened at the onset of the genocide, hundreds of thousands of lives would have been saved. The agreed upon Arusha Accords would have been able to be implemented, possibly beginning the reconciliation and reintegration process for all of Rwanda. The “what ifs” are endless, but the fact that the United States did not act has led to a tremendous undertaking of an AR2 Process burdened with the memory of nearly a million deaths.

⁷² Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. p.93.

⁷³ Vaccaro, “The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda,” in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch, p. 391.

⁷⁴ Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. p.118.

Overcoming the Influences of the International Community

Given the nature of events in Rwanda from its inauguration as an independent country in 1962 through the genocide of 1994, the actions of the international community, primarily the United Nations, France and the United States, many of the initial actions during the AR2 Process were a function of a failed international mindset. That mindset did not take into account the limits of the international community to effectively negotiate as an honest broker in the Rwandan conflict resolution by the examples of the Arusha, Lusaka and Pretoria agreements. The international community's mindset also does not manage the intervention of third parties into the conflicts, ensuring that they are honest brokers of international policy versus interventionist serving their own national interests demonstrated by the French in Operation Turquoise. Finally, the international mindset is framed by the preference to become involved in a conflict based more on political expediency versus a humanitarian cost as shown by the inaction of the United States.⁷⁵ This mindset continued to convolute the Rwandan AR2 process through a Western approach to an African/Rwandan problem.

There was an expectation that the Western idea of the rule of law, demonstrated through the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda (ICTR), would be able to reconcile the massive lawlessness demonstrated during the genocide. This Western cultural expectation did not address the retributive nature of the tribunals and the Rwandan tribal culture. While the international provided assets to aid in the AR2 Process, they were only treating symptoms to the immediate problem while overlooking the symptoms to the long recurring illness of cultural divide in Rwanda.

The international community provided humanitarian support, peacekeeping forces, negotiated settlements, UN Security Council Resolutions, and economic aid to Rwanda's AR2

⁷⁵ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*. p. 175-177.

Process. Rwanda, while trying to gain and maintain security, had to overcome the failures of international influence. Those failures included the exclusion of the new government from the international stage, the lack of understanding in implementing the International Criminal Tribunals in Rwanda, and the lack of economic support that existed within Rwanda in the post-Hutu era. Throughout the twelve years of conflict following the genocide, and while attempting to gain international recognition, Rwanda implemented policies allowing it to reconcile its deadly past. Rwanda overcame these challenges through strong leadership, perseverance, overly aggressive security measures, and innovative authoritarian policies.

Unconventional Methods in Rwanda

Rwanda, while purporting to be a democracy, has swayed from authoritarian after the commencement of the RPF-government in 1994 to a semi-authoritarian-government with the elections in 2003.⁷⁶ The RPF, much like former Hutu regimes, has its adversaries exiled, murdered, or disappear from the country. Currently, political parties that are formed with a contrary opinion to the RPF, such as the Democratic Republican Movement, are labeled as adhering to a “genocidal ideology” or threatening state security and are disbanded. The Tutsi dominated government, with a smattering of Hutu moderates that ascribe to the political and ideological beliefs of the Tutsis, make up the current regime led by Paul Kagame.⁷⁷ The path of semi-authoritarianism provides the government great latitude in implementing its policies of Gacaca Courts and Ingando Camps for reconciliation and reintegration. These policies followed the international community’s initial attempt to implement justice for the Rwandan genocide.

⁷⁶ Marina Ottaway. *Democracy Changed: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*. (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Semi-Authoritarian, 2003). p. 3. “[S]emi-authoritarian regimes are ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits.”

One of the international community's contributions to political stabilization and reconciliation was UNSCR 955 in November 1994, which implemented the International Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute crimes from the genocide.⁷⁸ The tribunal was designed to bring government leaders, military leaders, major party members, and the *Interahamwe* to justice. The retributive justice of the tribunals further widened the societal divide, as many of those convicted faced execution. The vendetta type atmosphere hindered the development of reconciliation and reintegration. The tribunals, slow in their process, would require nearly a century of adjudication to culminate the judicial process. In an effort to speed up the process and turn to a restorative form of justice, the Rwandan government introduced a form of tribal justice known as Gacaca (ga-CHA-cha).⁷⁹

Gacaca Courts placed the power of reconciliation with the people. The local populations elected the judges of the court. After a short training period, where judges received instruction on the levels of genocidal crimes, the types of punishment, and the implementation of the genocidal law, a local community could begin implementing their Gacaca Court. The genocide law passed in 1996 determined four levels of *Interahamwe*;

1. Planners, organizers and leader of the genocide,
2. People guilty of voluntary homicide,
3. People who committed violent acts without intent to kill,

⁷⁷ Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda." (2005) 201-224.

⁷⁸ UNSCR 955, 1994, Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda Having been established by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the International Tribunal for Rwanda") shall function in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute. United Nations. *The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-1996*. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996) 387-394.

4. People who committed crimes against property. Gacaca Courts could adjudicate all but the highest level of *Interahamwe*.⁸⁰

The Gacaca lightened the burden on the traditional court system, and began low-level reconciliation within the communities where punishments ranging from community service to life imprisonment is meted out.

Although innovative, Gacaca has its disadvantages. In order for an accused person to receive a lesser sentence they must incriminate themselves and/or others. If the accused confesses to committing acts of genocide, they must meet three criteria to gain their freedom. First, they must give all information about the crime they committed. Second, the accused must apologize to those that they committed a crime against, and finally, the accused must implicate their co-conspirators in the crime. The final requirement creates secondary and tertiary issues of false accusations and revenge that slow the reconciliation process. Even with these disadvantages, Gacaca is the best vehicle to achieve reconciliation without further aggravating the societal rift that has long divided the Rwandan population.⁸¹

Another government policy aimed at healing the rift in Rwandan society is the policy of *Ingando*. *Ingando*, or solidarity camps, is a program aimed at reconciling Rwanda's history, bringing Rwandans together as one people, and indoctrinating them in the policies and ideologies of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The program is for all members of Rwandan society, from the former soldiers of the Hutu regime, to prostitutes, to Gacaca judges. The goal is to make everyone Rwandan, versus having people identify themselves as Hutu or Tutsi. The program truly tries to wipe ethnicity out of Rwandan society. The public education system teaches the

⁷⁹ Eugenia Zorbas, "Reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda." *African Journal of Legal Studies* 1 (2005): 34-37.

⁸⁰ Nelson Alusala, "Disarmament as Part of Reconciliation in Rwanda." *Institute of Security Studies* 108 (June 2005): p. 4.

⁸¹ Ibid-p. 36-37.

Ingando principles at all levels of education. While *Ingando* appears well intentioned, it does not acknowledge all of Rwandan history, it accentuates the issue of colonialism being the root of Rwanda's societal issues, and it is comparative to Marxist/Leninist type indoctrination of the population.⁸²

The overarching goal of *Ingando* is to ensure that all members of Rwandan society have the capability of upward mobility and that an ethnic label does not hamper their aspirations. This conviction to change the ethnic makeup of the country, if achieved could have a lasting effect on the country's future. By allowing all members of the society to compete equally regardless of ethnicity, Rwanda will be able to grow as a country and compete economically at a greater rate than most countries on the African continent.

The Economics of Reconciliation

One of the profoundest impacts on the AR2 Process in Rwanda has come in the form of economic assistance. At the focal point of the international aid is the World Bank, which funds the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). MDRP complements national and regional peace initiatives, providing vital support for the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. It provides comprehensive support for demobilization and reintegration (D&R) by helping establish standard approaches throughout the region, coordinating partner initiatives, and providing financial and technical assistance in the demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex-combatants.⁸³

⁸² Mgbako. "Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda." *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 18 (2005): 201-224.

⁸³ The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) is a multi-agency effort that supports the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes region of Central Africa. The largest program of its kind in the world, MDRP currently targets an estimated 450,000 ex-combatants in seven countries: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. http://www.mdrp.org/about_us.html (accessed 1 Sept, 2007 - 29 February 2008)

The MDRP is integral in the reconciliation and reintegration effort within Rwanda. The program provides needed financial support to critical programs that will enable Rwanda to reconcile the twelve years of conflict it endured. MDRP has four objectives to achieving reconciliation and reintegration in Rwanda; Demobilize an estimated 36,000 ex-combatants from the RDF and members of armed groups, and support their transition to civilian life; in the spirit of the Arusha Agreement, support the reinsertion of ex-FAR; support the social and economic reintegration of all ex-combatants to be demobilized in stage II and all stage I ex-combatants who remain socio-economically vulnerable; and facilitate the reallocation of Government expenditure from defense to social and economic sectors.⁸⁴

MDRP is the organization that coordinates funding, but the funding comes from a multitude of sources and provides not only funding but also expertise in rebuilding Rwanda's government and economic infrastructure. By integrating ten different United Nations Programs, the World Food Program, the International Labor Organization, the European Union, the African Union, and the Food and Agriculture Organization this non-governmental conglomerate of international assistance can assist Rwanda in solving a multitude of economic issues with a myriad of expertise that parallels most developed nations.⁸⁵

The MDRP, founded in 2002 by the World Bank, is affecting change in Rwanda. By reconciling and re-integrating ex-combatants, which are a predominance of the male population, it is helping to build a country that observes the rule of law, contributes economically to the region, and respects its neighboring countries. The MDRP provides economic aid that enables

⁸⁴ MDRP Fact Sheet: Rwanda. http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_RWA_FS_0507.pdf (accessed 1 Sept 2007 - 29 February 2008)

⁸⁵ MDRP Partners. <http://www.mdrp.org/partners.html> (accessed 1 Sept 2007 - 29 February 2008)

Rwanda to grow, and not become dependent. With continued economic progress, Rwanda could become a stalwart in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.⁸⁶

Implications for AR2

The implications for the international community in the Rwandan AR2 process are manifested through the negative impacts of the community's actions before, during and after the Rwandan genocide and civil war. The international community's inability to be a positive influence on the AR2 process in Rwanda hinged on three issues; understanding the environment that is being influenced, understanding the ramifications of influencing the environment, and ensuring to mitigate any negative ramifications of influencing the environment. The implications of these issues are characterized in the Rwandan case study through the actions of the international community in regards to the United Nations, France, and the United States.

The magnitude of the implosion of Rwanda affected the reaction of the international community, especially the United Nations. The overwhelming bureaucracy of the United Nations hardened by years of negotiating Arusha Accords and the implementation of peacekeeping mandates, could not motivate the governing-body to act to stop the genocide. One of the greatest issues for the governing body to overcome was labeling the actions within Rwanda as genocide.⁸⁷ The implications of these actions were two-fold. First, Rwanda suffered the genocide. Second, the United Nations perpetuated the view that the body of nations could not affect international issues beyond basic negotiations. Had the United Nations been able to mobilize the world, it may have been able to stop the genocide and Rwanda would have been on the path to reconciliation with the initiation of the Arusha Accords.

⁸⁶ MDRP Partners. <http://www.mdrp.org/partners.htm> (accessed 1 September 2007 - 29 February 2008)

⁸⁷ Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. p. 636-40.

Even the United Nations, with its depth of knowledge from the governing body, was naïve in its appreciation of the situation in Rwanda. That naïveté manifested itself in the management of negotiations, the implementation of peacekeeping forces, and the implementation of the International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda. In future instances the United Nations must be more proactive in preventing situations that lead to a massive AR2 Process like Rwanda. Had the United Nations leadership capitalized upon the UNAMIR commander's recommendation, the resulting genocide may have been blunted, if not prevented entirely. Future UN Peacekeeping missions need to be fully managed by trained military leaders that are fully empowered by the civilian leadership of the United Nations to make timely decisions while implementing United Nations mandates. If General Dallaire been able to take action at critical occasions without being required to gain authorization for all of his decisions many Rwandan lives would have been saved.

The United Nations civilian leadership must also have a greater understanding of a country's capability when mandating criminal tribunals. Rwanda did not have an existing judiciary following the genocide nor a capable prison system that could handle the immense influx of prisoners from the subsequent trials of the genocidaries. Only through the innovations of Rwanda's new government was it able to overcome these immense obstacles to the AR2 process.

The impact of a successful United Nations would have removed France from the equation only partially. France's involvement in Rwanda is the anti-thesis of the definition of the honest broker. The ramification of having a France, who was so entwined in Rwanda affairs, act as the intermediary ignited deep resentment from the Rwandan Patriotic Front. France executed a questionable military operation that ostensibly appeared as a humanitarian operation, but can be argued as an operation with its sole intent to maintain French national interests. The perception that Operation Turquoise was a mission to save the remaining Hutu government resonated deeply through the AR2 process. France's actions affected not only the security of the future Rwandan government, but also its acceptance and recognition in the international community. In the

future, the international community, primarily the United Nations, must have a deeper understanding of why a country is willing to participate in a UN sanctioned mission.

The inaction of the most powerful government in the world, the United States, was the most powerful action to affect Rwanda. The United States, in cases like Rwanda, has a responsibility to impress the necessity of concerted action by the international community in terms of military assistance to stop the genocide, humanitarian aid to quickly recover the displaced people of the genocide, governmental assistance to form a positive multi-ethnic government, and to ensure that the rule of law and economic growth became the positive trends in Rwanda. Regardless of the United States' lack of national interest or national will, it has a responsibility to humankind. As the bastion of Democracy, human rights, and freedom it should have been the first to engage in Rwanda. The United States' inaction was as deadly action as any action taken by Hutu genocidaries, it prompted reticence throughout the international community and forced Rwanda down a longer path towards amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration.

Given all of the negative impacts of the international community, Rwanda was able to move forward after the genocide and subsequent civil war. Even without a declaration of amnesty, the Rwandan government has moved to provide justice for the victims of the genocide. The inventiveness of the Rwandan government in overcoming the dearth of legal capability by creating the Gacaca Courts showed how empowered leadership can provide the tool of justice in reconciling its constituents. The *Ingando*, while questionable in its method, shows how a country can regain its identity and work towards national unity after hundreds of years divisive policies aimed at setting segments of Rwandan against themselves. The idea of Rwandan national unity is a cornerstone to a successful reintegration of all members of society, both the victims of the genocide and those who committed the atrocities. The guiding principles of the amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration process are active within Rwandan existence today, in spite of the negative impacts of the international community before, during and after the genocide.

APPENDIX A: Timeline

The first section of the timeline extends from the beginning of colonization during the 1860's through the genocide in 1994.⁸⁸

1860s: Germany colonizes Ruanda-Urundi

1884: The Berlin Conference—the borders of most modern African countries are drawn by a group of Europeans in Berlin looking at a paper map.

1918: Treaty of Versailles—Ruanda-Urundi is made a protectorate of Belgium to govern. The territories of Ruanda and Urundi are administered separately under two different Tutsi monarchs.

1926: Belgium introduces a system of ethnic identity cards differentiating Hutu and Tutsi.

1957: PARMEHUTU (Party for the Emancipation of the Hutus) is formed while Rwanda is still under Belgian rule.

1959: The Tutsi king, Mwaami Rudahigwa, dies. Hutus rise up against the nobility and kill thousands of Tutsis. Thousands of Tutsis flee to Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire.

1961: The first “elections” are held in Rwanda, electing Grégoire Kayibanda, the head of PARMEHUTU, president.

1962: Rwanda gains independence from Belgium. Wide-scale killing of Tutsis and massive outflow of refugees, most to Uganda.

1963: Exiled Tutsis in Burundi attack Rwanda. Massacres of Tutsis inside Rwanda follow.

1967: Further massacres of Tutsis. It is estimated that by the mid-1960s, half of the Tutsi population is living outside Rwanda.

1973: Purge of Tutsis from universities, more killings, more Tutsis flee country. General Juvénal Habyarimana, chief of staff of the army, seizes power. He institutes a one-party (MRND) state and establishes ethnic quotas in all public service jobs and schools. Tutsis are restricted to 9 percent.

1986: Rwandan exiles in Uganda are part of the National Resistance Army that overthrows Milton Obote and puts Yoweri Museveni in power. These exiles then form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

⁸⁸ Tracy E. Longacre, “Rwanda in the Aftermath of Genocide: Photo Gallery and Essay” <http://www.telphoto.com/index.html> (accessed 1 February 2008 - 29 February 2008). This timeline was taken in its entirety from the above website. There have been superficial edits made on the text in order to remove the emotional overtones for the sake of this monograph.

July 1990: Under pressure from western aid donors, Habyarimana concedes the principle of multi-party democracy and new political parties are allowed to form.

October 1990: The RPF invades Rwanda from Uganda. After fierce fighting in which French and Zairian troops are called in to assist the government, a ceasefire is signed on 29 March 1991.

1990-1993: The Rwandan army, under the direction of the stridently anti-Tutsi Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR), begins to train and arm civilian militias known as the *interahamwe* (“those who stand together”). President Habyarimana stalls on the establishment of a true multi-party system with power sharing.

February 1993: The RPF launches a fresh offensive. The guerillas reach the outskirts of Kigali and French troops are again called in to help the government side.

August 1993: After months of negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, President Habyarimana signs the Arusha Accord, agreeing to power sharing with both the Hutu opposition and the RPF. He also agrees to integrate the RPF into the Rwandan army.

September 1993-March 1994: Habyarimana stalls on setting up a power-sharing government. Training of *interahamwe* intensifies. Radio Television Libres des Milles Collines begins broadcasting exhortations to attack the Tutsis.

6 April 1994: President Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi are killed when Habyarimana’s plane is shot down as it approaches Kigali airport.

7 April 1994: The Rwandan interim government seizes control, lead by Bagosora, and the genocide begins.

8 April 1994: The Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) launches a major offensive to end the genocide and rescue 600 of its troops surrounded in Kigali.

21 April 1994: UNAMIR force reduction instituted from 2,500 to 250 following the murder of 10 Belgian soldiers guarding the moderate Hutu prime minister, Agathe Uwiliyingimana.

30 April 1994: The UN Security Council spends eight hours discussing the Rwandan crisis. The resolution condemning the killing omits the word “genocide” which would have legally obliged the UN to act to “prevent and punish” the perpetrators.

17 May 1994: The UN finally agrees to send 6,800 troops to Rwanda with power to defend civilians. The United States forbids its spokespersons to use the word “genocide.” Deployment of the mainly African UN forces is delayed as the United States argues with the UN over the cost of providing the heavily armored vehicles it promised.

22 June 1994: Operation Turquoise launched with United Security Council resolution. The mission is to create a safe zone in southern Rwanda and end the genocide. The actions provide an escape route for thousands of FAR troops and the interim-government, including Bagosora.

July 1994: Kigali Falls, RPF takes over control of the government.

The second portion of the timeline extends from 1994 to 2008 and was extracted from British

Broadcasting Company archives.⁸⁹

1994-96 - Refugee camps in Zaire fall under the control of the Hutu militias responsible for the genocide in Rwanda.

1995 - Extremist Hutu militias and Zairian government forces attack local Zairian Banyamulenge Tutsis; Zaire attempts to force refugees back into Rwanda.

1995 - UN-appointed international tribunal begins charging and sentencing a number of people responsible for the Hutu-Tutsi atrocities.

Intervention in DR Congo

1996 - Rwandan troops invade and attack Hutu militia-dominated camps in Zaire in order to drive home the refugees.

1997 - Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebels depose President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire; Laurent Kabila becomes president of Zaire, which is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo.

1998 - Rwanda switches allegiance to support rebel forces trying to depose Kabila in the wake of the Congolese president's failure to expel extremist Hutu militias.

2000 March - Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, resigns over differences regarding the composition of a new cabinet and after accusing parliament of targeting Hutu politicians in anti-corruption investigations.

Kagame elected

2000 April - Ministers and members of parliament elect Vice-President Paul Kagame as Rwanda's new president.

2001 October - Voting to elect members of traditional "Gacaca" courts begins. The courts - in which ordinary Rwandans judge their peers - aim to clear the backlog of 1994 genocide cases.

2001 December - A new flag and national anthem are unveiled to try to promote national unity and reconciliation.

2002 April - Former president Pasteur Bizimungu is arrested and faces trial on charges of illegal political activity and threats to state security.

2002 July - Rwanda, DR Congo sign peace deal under which Rwanda will pull troops out of DR Congo and DR Congo will help disarm Rwandan Hutu gunmen blamed for killing Tutsi minority in 1994 genocide.

⁸⁹ British Broadcasting Company, "Timeline Rwanda: A Chronology of Key Events" <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1070329.stm> (accessed 1 February 2008 - 29 February 2008). The 1994 – 2008 portion of the timeline was taken without edits from the above website.

DR Congo pull-out

2002 October - Rwanda says it has pulled the last of its troops out of DR Congo, four years after they went in to support Congolese rebels against the Kabila government.

2003 May - Voters back a draft constitution that bans the incitement of ethnic hatred.

2003 August - Paul Kagame wins the first presidential elections since the 1994 genocide.

2003 October - First multi-party parliamentary elections; President Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front wins absolute majority. EU observers say poll was marred by irregularities and fraud.

2003 December - Three former media directors found guilty of inciting Hutus to kill Tutsis during 1994 genocide and receive lengthy jail sentences.

2004 March - President Kagame rejects French report that says he ordered 1994 attack on president's plane, which sparked genocide.

2004 June - Former president, Pasteur Bizimungu, is sentenced to 15 years in jail for embezzlement, inciting violence and associating with criminals.

2005 March - Main Hutu rebel group, FDLR, says it is ending its armed struggle. FDLR is one of several groups accused of creating instability in DR Congo; many of its members are accused of taking part in 1994 genocide.

2005 July - Government begins the mass release of 36,000 prisoners. Most of them have confessed to involvement in the 1994 genocide. It is the third phase of releases since 2003 - part of an attempt to ease overcrowding.

2006 January - Rwanda's 12 provinces are replaced by a smaller number of regions with the aim of creating ethnically diverse administrative areas.

2006 November - Rwanda breaks off diplomatic ties with France after a French judge issues an international arrest warrant for President Kagame, alleging he was involved in bringing down Habyarimana's plane.

2006 December - Father Athanase Seromba becomes the first Roman Catholic priest to be convicted for involvement in the 1994 genocide. The International Criminal Tribunal sentences him to 15 years in prison.

2007 February - Some 8,000 prisoners accused of genocide are released. Some 60,000 suspects have been freed since 2003 to ease prison overcrowding.

2007 April - Former president, Pasteur Bizimungu, is released from jail three years into his 15-year sentence after receiving a presidential pardon.

2007 October - Inquiry launched into 1994 presidential plane crash that sparked genocide.

2007 November - Rwanda signs peace agreement with Democratic Republic of Congo. Under the deal DRC will hand over those suspected of involvement in the 1994 genocide to Kigali and to

the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

2008 January - French police arrest former Rwandan army officer Marcel Bivugabagabo who is on list of war criminals wanted for trial by the Rwandan government.

APPENDIX B: Arusha, Lusaka, and Pretoria Agreements

Arusha Peace Agreement 1994⁹⁰

PEACE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
AND
THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the one hand, and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the other; Firmly resolved to find a political negotiated solution to the war situation confronting the Rwandese people since 1st October, 1990; Considering and appreciating the efforts deployed by the countries of the Sub-region with a view to helping the Rwandese people to recover peace; Referring to the numerous high-level meetings held respectively at Mwanza United Republic of Tanzania, on 17th October, 1990, in Gbadolite, Republic of Zaire, on 26th October, 1990, in Goma, Republic of Zaire, on 20th November, 1990, in Zanzibar, United Republic of Tanzania, on 17th February, 1991, in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 19th February, 1991 and from 5th to 7 March, 1993;

Considering that all these meetings aimed first and foremost at establishing a ceasefire so as to enable the two parties to look for a solution to the war through direct negotiations;

Noting the N'SELE Ceasefire Agreement, of 29th March 1991 as amended in GBADOLITE on 16th September, 1991 and at ARUSHA on 12th July 1992;

Reaffirming their unwavering determination to respect principles underlying the Rule of Law which include democracy, national unity, pluralism, the respect of fundamental freedoms and rights of the individual; Considering that these principles constitute the basis and consistency of a lasting peace awaited by the Rwandese people for the benefit of the present and future generations; Noting the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law signed at Arusha on 18th August, 1992;

Considering that the two parties accepted the principle of power sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government; Noting the Protocols of Agreement on Power-Sharing signed at ARUSHA respectively on 30th October 1992, and on 9th January 1993;

Considering that the conflictual situation between the two parties can only be brought to an end through the formation of one and single National Army and a new National Gendarmerie from forces of the two warring parties;

⁹⁰ The Great African Lakes Documentation Network collect and publish grey literature about the Great Lakes Region, mainly Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern Congo.
<http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2403.pdf> (accessed 1 February 2008 - 29 February 2008).

Noting of the Protocol of Agreement on the integration of Armed Forces of both Parties, signed at Arusha on 3rd August 1993;

Recognizing that the unity of the Rwandese people cannot be achieved until a definitive solution to the problem of Rwandese refugees is found and that the return of Rwandese refugees to their country is an inalienable right and constitutes a factor for peace and national unity and reconciliation;

Noting the Protocol of Agreement on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons, signed at ARUSHA on 9th June 1993;

Resolved to eradicate and put a definite end to all the root causes that gave rise to the war;

Have, at the conclusion of the Peace Talks held in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, between 10th July, 1992 and 24th June, 1993 as well as Kinyira, Republic of Rwanda from 19th to 25th July, 1993 under the aegis of the Facilitator, His Excellency Ali Hassan MWINYI, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, in the presence of the Representative of the Mediator, His Excellency, MOBUTU SESESEKO, President of the Republic of Zaire as well as Representatives of the Current Chairmen of the OAU, His Excellency Abdou DIOUF, President of the Republic of Senegal, and Hosni MUBARAK, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Secretary General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros GHALI and Observers representing the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Burundi, the United States of America, France, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe; Calling the International Community to witness;

Hereby agree on the following provisions.

Article 1: The war between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front is hereby brought to an end.

Article 2: The following documents are an integral part of the present Peace Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

I. The N'SELE Ceasefire Agreement of 29th March, 1991 between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, as amended in GBADOLITE on 16th September, 1991 and at ARUSHA on 2nd July, 1992;

II. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law, signed at ARUSHA on 18th September 1992;

III. The Protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government, signed at ARUSHA respectively on 30th October 1992 and on 9th January 1993;

IV. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons, signed at Arusha on 9th June 1993;

V. The Protocol Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the integration of Armed Forces of the two parties, signed at ARUSHA on, 3rd August 1993;

VI. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions signed at Arusha on 3rd August 1993.

These entire documents are attached as Annex.

Article 3: The two parties also agree that the Constitution of 10th June 1991 and the Arusha Peace Agreement shall constitute indissolubly the Fundamental Law. That shall govern the Country during the Transition period, taking in to account the following provisions:

1. The following articles of the Constitution shall be replaced by the provisions of the Peace Agreement relating to the same matters. The Articles in question are: 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75 paragraph 2, 77 paragraphs 3 and 4, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88 paragraph 1, 90, 96, 99, 101.

2 In case of conflict between the other provisions of the Constitution and those of the Peace Agreement, the provisions of the Peace Agreement shall prevail.

3. The Constitutional Court shall verify the conformity of Laws and Orders in Council with the Fundamental Law thus defined. Pending the enactment of the law on the Supreme Court, the existing Constitutional Court shall remain composed of both the Court of Cassation and the State of Council. The Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court shall assume the presidency.

Article 4: In case of conflict between the provisions of the Fundamental Law and those of other Laws and Regulations, the provisions of the Fundamental Law shall prevail.

Article 5: The Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front undertake to make every possible effort to ensure that the present Peace Agreement is respected and implemented. They further undertake to spare no effort to promote National Unity and Reconciliation.

Article 6: The two parties agree on the appointment of Mr. TWAGIRAMUNGU Faustin as Prime Minister of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, in accordance with Articles 6 and 51 of the Protocol of Agreement between the, Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government.

Article 7: The Transitional Institutions shall be set up within thirty seven (37) days following the signing of the Peace Agreement.

Article 8: The current Government shall remain in Office until the Broad-Based. Transitional Government is established. The maintenance of that Government does not mean that it can encroach on the mandate of the Broad-Based Transitional Government being established. The current Government shall, in no case, take decisions that may be detrimental to the implementation of the Broad-Based Transitional program.

Article 9; the "Conseil National de Developpement" (CND) shall remain in Office until the Transitional National Assembly is established. However, as from the date of signing the Peace Agreement, it shall not enact laws.

Article 10: The present Peace Agreement is signed by the President of the Republic of Rwanda and the Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, in the presence of:

- The Facilitator, His Excellency, Ali Hassan MWINYI, President of the United Republic of Tanzania,
- His Excellency, Yoweri Kaguta MUSEVENI, President of the Republic of Uganda; Observer country;
- His Excellency Melchior NDADAYE, President of the Republic of Burundi, Observer country;
- The Representative of the Mediator, His Excellency Faustin BIRINDWA, Prime Minister of Zaire;
- Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM, Secretary General of the OAU;
- The Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations;
- The Representative of the Current Chairman of the OAU;
- The Representatives of other Observer countries: Germany, Belgium, and United States of America, France, Nigeria and Zimbabwe;
- The delegations of the two parties.

Article 11: The present Peace Agreement shall come into force upon it's signing by the parties. Done at Arusha, on the 4th day of the month of August 1993 both in French and English languages, the original text being in French.

President of the Republic of Rwanda Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front
In the presence of the Facilitator Ali Hassan MWINYI President of the United Republic of Tanzania

[Signatories]

Lusaka Agreement 1999⁹¹

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Summary of Lusaka accord

NAIROBI, 21 JULY (IRIN) - Following are the main components of the DRC ceasefire agreement signed in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, on 10 July, by leaders of six countries involved in the conflict (the DRC, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda and Uganda), but not by the Congolese rebel groups:

Cessation of hostilities

Within 24 hours of the signing of the Lusaka agreement, all air, land and sea attacks are to cease and the military forces are to disengage. All acts of violence against the civilian population are also to cease, while the parties are to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance through the opening of aid corridors.

Joint Military Commission

⁹¹ DRC: Summary of the Lusaka Accord. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_72299c.html (accessed 14 December 2007 - 29 February 2008).

A Joint Military Commission (JMC) - composed of two representatives from each belligerent party under a neutral chairman to be appointed by the OAU - is to be established within one week of the signing of the agreement to oversee its implementation until the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. The duties of the JMC, which is to operate under the responsibility of a separate ministerial-level political committee, are to include, among other things, investigating reported ceasefire violations, working out mechanisms to disarm militia groups, verifying the disarmament of Congolese civilians, and monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces.

Deployment of peacekeeping force

An "appropriate" force is to be subsequently deployed by the UN to ensure implementation of the agreement. Among other things, the force is to take necessary measures to ensure compliance, collect weapons from civilians, and schedule and supervise the withdrawal of all foreign forces, in collaboration with the JMC and the OAU. It would also be tasked with providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees and other affected persons and ensuring their protection.

Disarmament of militia groups

The agreement envisages the tracking down and disarming of armed groups, the screening of mass killers and war criminals, and the handing over of suspected 'genocidaries' to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania. The countries of origin of members of armed groups are to take necessary measures to facilitate their repatriation, which could include the granting of amnesty to non-genocidaries.

The "armed groups" are identified as the Rwandan ex-FAR and Interahamwe, the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II), the Former Ugandan National Army (FUNA), the Burundian Forces de defense pour la democratie (FDD) and Angola's UNITA.

National reconciliation

Forty-five days after the signing of the Lusaka agreement, the DRC government, the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD), the Mouvement de liberation congolais (MLC), unarmed opposition groups and Congolese civil society are to begin up to six weeks of open political negotiations, to culminate in the setting up of a new political dispensation in the DRC.

The negotiations are to be held under the authority of a neutral facilitator acceptable to all Congolese parties, to be chosen within 15 days of the signing. The dialogue's agenda would include the organization of democratic elections, among other topics. Following the negotiations, a restructured national army is to be formed, which would integrate the forces of the Congolese army, the RCD and the MLC.

Other issues

Other provisions of the agreement include: the release of hostages and exchange of prisoners of war; the reestablishment of state administration over DRC territory; and the need to protect the rights of ethnic groups and to address the security concerns of the DRC and its neighbors.

Copyright (c) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 1999

Pretoria Agreement 2002⁹²

Peace Agreement Between the Governments of the Republic of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops from the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Dismantling of the Ex-Far and Interahamwe Forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Pretoria Agreement)

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Washington, DC
July 30, 2002

1. The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement of 1999 sets out modalities for the tracking down and disarmament of ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the territory of the DRC. To date, it has not been possible to effectively implement the decisions relating to these armed groups.
2. The governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda have sought to find an expeditious manner of implementing these decisions.
3. The Parties acknowledge that there have been numerous attempts to implement agreements reached between them with regard to this matter. The Parties also acknowledge that the launch of the African Union, recent UN resolutions and the involvement of a third party present a window of opportunity to urgently resolve this matter.

By third party, both Parties understand this to refer to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and South Africa, in its dual capacity as Chairperson of the African Union and facilitator of this process.

The Parties further acknowledge that the resolution of this matter will be a process and not an event.

4. The government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reaffirms its stated legitimate right that the forces of the government of Rwanda withdraw from the territory of the DRC without delay.
5. The government of Rwanda reaffirms its readiness to withdraw from the territory of the DRC as soon as effective measures that address its security concerns, in particular the dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces, have been agreed to. Withdrawal should start simultaneously with the implementation of the measures, both of which will be verified by MONUC, JMC and the third party.

⁹² This text was taken directly from the United States Department of State, Peace Agreement Between the Governments of the Republic of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops from the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Dismantling of the Ex-Far and Interahamwe Forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Pretoria Agreement), Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Washington, DC July 30, 2002. <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/csbn/rd/22637.htm> (accessed 14 December 2007 - 29 February 2008)

6. The Interahamwe and ex-FAR armed groups fled to various countries, including the DRC, after participating in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The DRC government states that it does not wish to have these armed groups present in the territory of the DRC. The DRC government does not want its territory to be used as a base for attacks against its neighboring countries.

7. The DRC government is ready to collaborate with MONUC, the JMC and any other Force constituted by the third party, to assemble and disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in the whole of the territory of the DRC.

8. In this regard, the Parties agree as follows:

8.1 The DRC government will continue with the process of tracking down and disarming the Interahamwe and ex-FAR within the territory of the DRC under its control.

8.2 The DRC government will collaborate with MONUC and the JMC in the dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the DRC.

8.3 The Rwandan government undertakes to withdraw its troops from the DRC territory, following the process outlined in paragraph 5. This will be according to measures as detailed in the implementation program.

8.4 That MONUC, acting together with all relevant UN Agencies, should be requested to immediately set up processes to repatriate all Rwandese, ex-FAR and Interahamwe to Rwanda, including those in Kamina, in co-ordination with the governments of Rwanda and the DRC.

8.5 The governments of the DRC and Rwanda would provide the facilitator of this meeting and the UN Secretary-General with all the information in their possession relating to these armed groups.

8.6 The third party will take responsibility for verifying whatever information received, through whatever measures deemed necessary.

8.7 The Parties agree to accept the verification report from the third party.

8.8 That the UN considers changing the mandate of MONUC into a Peacekeeping mission.

8.9 MONUC should immediately proceed to implement Phase 3 of its DDRR and finalise its deployment in the DRC, especially in the eastern part of the territory.

8.10 The Parties agree that their respective governments would put into place a mechanism for the normalization of the security situation along their common border. This mechanism may include the presence of an International Force to cooperate with the two countries, in the short term, to secure their common border.

8.11 That a bilateral team, facilitated by South Africa and the UN Secretary-General, work on a detailed calendar to implement this agreement.

8.12 Both Parties commit themselves to accepting the role and findings of the third party in the process of implementing this agreement, and further accept that the commitments and agreements reached in this Peace Agreement are binding.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alusala, Nelson. 2005. Disarmament as Part of Reconciliation in Rwanda. *Institute of Security Studies* 108 (June): 1-16.
- Ali-Dinar, Ali B. PhD Ed. 1999. DRC: Summary of Lusaka Accord. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_72299c.html accessed 14 December 2007.
- Akhavan, Payam. 1997. Justice and Reconciliation in The Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. *Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law* 7 (December): 325-348.
- Amstutz, Mark R. "Is Reconciliation Possible After Genocide? The Case of Rwanda." *Journal of Church & State* 48, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 541-565.
- Barnett, Michael. 2002. *Eyewitness to Genocide*. London: Cornell University Press.
- Betts, Alexander. "Should Approaches to Post-Conflict Justice and Reconciliation be Determined Globally, Nationally Or Locally?" *European Journal of Development Research* 17, no. 4 (12 2005): 735-752.
- British Broadcasting Company. 2008. Timeline Rwanda: A chronology of key events. London: British Broadcasting Company. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1070329.stm> accessed 1 February 2008.
- Breed, Ananda. "Performing Reconciliation in Rwanda." *Peace Review* 18, no. 4 (2006): 507-513.
- Buckley-zistel, Susanne. "Dividing and Uniting: The use of Citizenship Discourses in Conflict and Reconciliation in Rwanda." *Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations* 20, no. 1 (01 2006): 101-113.
- Cairns, Ed. "Healing, Reconciliation and the Prevention of Violence: A Comment." *Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology* 24, no. 3 (05 2005): 335-337.
- Chrétien, Jean – Pierre. *The Great Lakes of Africa*. 2003. New York: Zone Books.
- Connaughton, R.M. 1996. *Military Support and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance: Rwanda April-December 1994*. United Kingdom: The British Army Review, Strategic & Combat Studies Institute.
- Dallaire, Romeo. 2003. *Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers.
- Daly, Erin. 2002. Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. *International Law and Politics* 34 (August): 355-396.
- Des Forges, Alison. 1999. *Leave None to tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Destexhe, Alain. 1995. *Rwanda and Genocide*. New York: New York University Press.
- Durch, William J. ed. 1996. *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Eltringham, Nigel. 2004. *Accounting for horror: Post-genocide debate in Rwanda*. London: Pluto Press.

- Gourevitch, Philip. 1998. *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux.
- Graybill, Lyn S. "Ten Years After, Rwanda Tries Reconciliation." *Current History* 103, no. 673 (05 2004): 202-205.
- Gribbin, Robert E. 2005. *In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda*. New York: iUniverse Inc.
- Hodgkin, Marian. "Reconciliation in Rwanda: Education History and the State." *Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 1 (2006): 199-210.
- Jones, Bruce D. *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay. 1998. *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: University Press.
- Longacre, Tracy E. 2003. *Rwanda in the Aftermath of Genocide: Photo Gallery and Essay*. http://www.telphoto.com/Rwanda_Home.htm accessed 1February 2008.
- Melvorn, Linda. 2004. *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide*. New York: Verso.
- Mgbako, Chi. 2005. *Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda*. *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 18: 201-224.
- Odom, Thomas P. 2005. *Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Ottaway, Marina. 2003. *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*. Washington D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Pham, Phuong N., Harvey M. Weinstein, and Timothy Longman. "Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in Rwanda: Implications for Attitudes Toward Justice and Reconciliation." *JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association* 292, no. 5 (08/04 2004): 602-612.
- Pottier, Johan. 2002. *Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pugh, Michael. Ed. 1997. *The UN, Peace and Force*. London: Frank Cass and Company LTD.
- International Research Documents for the African Great Lakes Region. 2006. <http://www.grandslacs.net> accessed 14 December 2007.
- Sarkin, Jeremy. "The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda." *Human Rights Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (08 1999): 767-823.
- Staub, Ervin, Laurie Anne Pearlman, Alexandra Gubin, and Athanase Hagengimana. "Healing, Reconciliation, Forgiving and the Prevention of Violence After Genocide Or Mass Killing: An Intervention and its Experimental Evaluation in Rwanda." *Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology* 24, no. 3 (05 2005): 297-334.
- Strauss, Scott. 2006. *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda*. London: Cornell University Press.
- The World Bank. 2007. *Multi-country demobilization and reintegration program*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. On-line. Available from Internet, <http://www.mdrp.org/index.html> accessed 1 September 2007.
- Tiemessen, Alan Erin. 2004. *After Arusha: Gacaca justice in post-genocide Rwanda*. *African Studies Quarterly* 8, Issue 1, (Fall): 57-76.

- Twagilimana, Aimable. 2003. *The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Umutesi, Marie Béatrice. "Is Reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis Possible?" *Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 1 (2006): 157-171.
- United Nations. 1996. *The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-1996*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.
- United Nations. 2006. *MONUC: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.
- United States Department of State. 2002. "Peace agreement between the governments of the Republic of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Washington D.C.: United States Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/csbn/rd/22637.html> accessed 14 December 2007.
- Waugh, Colin M. 2004. *Paul Kagamé and Rwanda : power, genocide and Rwandan Patriotic Front*. Jefferson : McFarland and Company, Inc.
- Zorbas, Eugenia. 2004. Reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. *African Journal of Legal Studies* 1: 29-52.